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FEDERAL GUILTY PLEAS UNDER RULE 11:
THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
THE POST-BOYKIN ERA
Julian A. Cook, III*
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs per-
haps the most essential and common practice in the federal criminal
justice system-the guilty plea.1 Despite the public's focus on the ex-
citement and drama engendered by real and fictional criminal trials,
the overwhelming majority of criminal matters reach a negotiated res-
olution. Indeed, the importance of the guilty plea to the judiciary,
prosecutors, and even defense attorneys cannot be overstated. With-
out guilty pleas, the criminal justice system would malfunction; the
system is simply incapable of accommodating the constitutional exer-
cise of a defendant's trial right in each instance.
The federal plea process was revised in 1975 when, in response to
the 1969 United States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v. Alabama,2
sweeping amendments to Rule 11 were enacted in order to better en-
sure the entry of intelligent and voluntary guilty pleas. In lieu of the
comparatively scant.verbiage that characterized the pre-1975 version,3
* Visiting Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law;
Associate Professor, Texas Southern University, Thurgood Marshall School of Law.
A.B., Duke University, 1983; M.PA., Columbia University, 1985; J.D., University of
Virginia, 1988. I would like to thank Professors AngelaJ. Davis and Raymond Brown
for their tremendous insights and suggested revisions. In addition, my sincere thanks
are extended to Irrekka Clark and Erin Sanchack, who provided invaluable research
assistance. Finally, I thank my wife, Robin, for her outstanding comments on earlier
drafts of this article.
1 See Act ofJuly 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, § 3(5)-(10), 89 Stat. 370, 372-73.
Though enacted in July 1975, the revised procedures did not go into effect until De-
cember 1975. Id. § 2.
2 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (holding that "[i]t was error, plain on the face of the
record, for [a] trial judge to accept [a defendant's] guilty plea without an affirmative
showing that it was intelligent and voluntary").
3 For discussion of the pre-1975 version of Rule 11, see infra notes 50-54 and
accompanying text.
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the new rule detailed a plea process replete with procedures4 de-
signed to guide the federal judiciary and protect the due process in-
terests of the defendant.5  However, twenty-five years after the
implementation of the revisions, there is, at a minimum, a considera-
ble question whether the laudable objectives underlying the reforms
are being fulfilled. Indeed, this Article posits that Rule 11 has not
fulfilled its original promise. Instead of protecting against unintelli-
gent and involuntary pleas, the rule's plain language and its appellate
interpretation have produced a plea process that pays little homage to
the original Boykin ideals.
Though guilty pleas are generally impervious to successful post-
plea challenges, 6 it is perhaps fitting that on this twenty-fifth anniver-
sary Rule 11 was at the center of a high-profile habeas corpus petition,
notable if only for its named claimant. Theodore Kaczynski (the
"Unabomber") entered guilty pleas on January 22, 1998 in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California to an array
of charges pertaining to bombing-related activity that caused three
deaths and twenty-three injuries over the course of two decades. 7 In
his petition before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Kaczynski
sought a new trial, arguing that his guilty pleas were the coercive prod-
4 For discussion of the 1975 version of Rule 11, as well as subsequent amend-
ments, see infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
5 For example, the accompanying Advisory Committee's notes to the 1975
amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 provide, with respect to
subdivision (d): "The new rule specifies that the court personally address the defen-
dant in determining the voluntariness of the plea." The Supreme Court had previ-
ously stated:
By personally interrogating the defendant, not only will the judge be better
able to ascertain the plea's voluntariness, but he will also develop a more
complete record to support his determination in a subsequent post-convic-
tion attack .... Both of these goals are undermined in proportion to the
degree the district judge resorts to "assumptions" not based upon recorded
responses to his inquiries.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969).
6 See United States v. Newson, 46 F.3d 730, 732 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that
review of a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made under
an abuse of discretion standard); Peter T. Wendel, The Case Against Plea Bargaining
Child Abuse Charges: "Dejd Vu All Over Again," 64 Mo. L. REv. 317, 340 n.71 (1999)
(stating that after the imposition of sentence, motions seeking the withdrawal of a
guilty plea "are granted only to correct a manifest injustice").
7 See United States v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2001); see also A
Scandal, an Upset, a Stormy Year, STAR TIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Dec. 31, 1998, at
A18; Peter Hartlaub, Courts Reduce Paperwork Blizzard with Web Sites; in Stayner Case,
Media Requests are a Breeze via Online Document Postings, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 18, 1999, at
A-i; Howard Mintz, Kaczynski's Endgame Raises Many Questions; Legal Experts Find Death-
Penalty Plea a Dangerous Precedent, DENVER PosT, May 29, 2000, at 19A.
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uct of attorney intransigence over defense strategy. Specifically, Ka-
czynski asserted "a mental state defense that [he] would have found
unendurable" as forging an involuntary decision to concede his guilt.8
On February 12, 2001, a divided Ninth Circuit denied Kaczynski's peti-
tion, finding that there was "no reason [to] not fully [ ] credit Kaczyn-
ski's sworn statements in the plea agreement, as well as during the
plea colloquy, that he was pleading voluntarily."9
While the Kaczynski petition certainly presented an intriguing ap-
pellate issue, it is beyond the scope of this Article to critique the mer-
its of his individual claim. Rather, the value of the Kaczynski matter
lies in an analysis of its plea colloquy. In contrast to the case's consid-
erable notoriety, which was decidedly atypical, the plea colloquy is re-
markably conformist. It proceeds in a manner consonant with Rule
11 mandates, yet is emblematic of the inherent deficiencies associated
with the federal plea structure. Accordingly, this Article's forthcom-
ing review of the Kaczynski plea colloquy is not intended as a singular
indictment of a particular case, court, or district, but to depict a fed-
eral plea process beset with evidential and procedural inconsistencies
and an overarching concern for judicial economy.
Our public policy purportedly reflects our societal and/or politi-
cal values. This Article will demonstrate how Rule 11, and its appel-
late construction, reflect a contorted value priority; one that
unnecessarily devalues individual due process in exchange for a mis-
perceived notion of judicial economy. To that end, this Article com-
mences with a review of the constitutional standards that accompany
guilty pleas as well as the historical evolution of Rule 11. Thereafter,
Rule 11 will be discussed-with highlighted excerpts from the Kaczyn-
ski plea colloquy--in light of certain federal evidence rules, offender
characteristic data, and economic and professional incentives that im-
pact indigent representation. This Article will then review the most
recent and significant addendums to Rule 11-the appellate waiver
and harmless error provisions-and demonstrate how these seemingly
unexceptional modifications, and their subsequentjudicial interpreta-
tion, have had a profoundly deleterious impact upon individual due
process and are flatly inconsistent with Rule l's purported underly-
ing objectives. Finally, this Article will conclude with a suggested mea-
sure of reform. Though temperate, the proffered restructure of Rule
11 will alleviate many of the inequities associated with the current
8 Kaczynski, 239 F.3d at 1114.
9 Id. at 1115. Judges Rymer and Brunetti composed the two-person majority. Id.
at 1108. Judge Reinhardt issued a dissenting opinion. Id. at 1119.
2002]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
structure and restore the value priority originally contemplated in
Boykin-one with a paramount concern for individual due process.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
Prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea, certain constitutional pre-
requisites must be satisfied. For instance, Fifth Amendment due pro-
cess requires that a court be satisfied that a defendant is mentally
competent to enter a plea. 10 For years, there was a split among the
circuits as to which of two competing standards should be employed
to ascertain a defendant's competency to plead guilty." One stan-
dard-employed to assess a defendant's competency to stand trial-
required the court to determine whether a defendant had "a rational
and factual understanding of the proceedings and [was] capable of
assisting his counsel."'12 The other standard-utilized in the context
of counsel waivers-permitted the waiver of constitutional rights "only
if [the defendant] ha[d] the capacity for 'reasoned choice' among the
alternatives available to him."' 3 This divide was settled finally in 1993.
In Godinez v. Moran, the Supreme Court held that the competency
standard for standing trial, entering a guilty plea and waiving counsel
were identical-namely, that a defendant was deemed competent
under any of these scenarios, so long as he was able to understand the
proceedings against him and was able to assist his attorney.14
In addition, a trial court may not accept a defendant's plea of
guilty unless it was entered voluntarily. To be considered "voluntary,"
a defendant who enters a guilty plea must do so
fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of
any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own
counsel, [and said plea] must stand unless induced by threats (or
promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation
(including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by
10 See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966) (stating that Robinson was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the issue of his competency to stand trial).
11 See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 395-96 (1993) (observing that the Ninth
and D.C. Circuits had employed a heightened competency standard that differed
from the standard employed by every other circuit that had considered the issue).
For additional discussion of Godinez, see infra notes 134-48 and accompanying text.
12 Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 266 (9th Cir. 1992).
13 Id. (quoting Harding v. Lewis, 834 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1987)).
14 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402.
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promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper re-
lationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).15
Satisfactioh of this standard, however, does not require the entry
of a plea independent of all threats, pressures, and promises. After
all, plea agreements themselves are promised dispositions, and the
criminal trial setting is often ripe with inherent pressures, which can
make decisionmaking difficult. 16 For example, it has been held that a
guilty plea is voluntary17 when induced by threats of increased penal-
ties1 8 or additional charges,19 when a defendant's relative is
threatened with indictment,20 or when non-governmental sources
coerce a plea.2 ' Rather, more is required before a plea will be voided
on voluntariness grounds. Though a somewhat nebulous concept, a
plea will be deemed "involuntary" when it is demonstrated that the
plea was the product of "actual or threatened physical harm or by
mental coercion" that overcame the defendant's will.22
Moreover, a plea of guilty may not be accepted unless the court is
satisfied that the defendant comprehends several critical items associ-
ated with the plea. One such requirement is that the defendant ap-
preciate the nature of the crime to which he is admitting guilt.23
15 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (citing Shelton v. United
States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957)); see also WAYNE R. LAFAvE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 994-96 (3d ed. 2000) (describing generally the voluntariness standard).
16 See 30 KENT B. SMITH, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE § 1236 (2d ed. 1983).
17 SeeAram A. Schvey & Katherine Gates, Guilty Pleas, 88 GEo. LJ. 1228, 1245-54
(2000) (summarizing legal concepts and providing detailed citations of case law per-
taining to the voluntariness of guilty pleas).
18 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 756-57 (holding that defendant who entered guilty plea,
perhaps to avoid possible death sentence, did so knowingly and voluntarily).
19 See Grabowski v. Jackson County Pub. Defender's Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1389
(5th Cir. 1995) (stating that not all pressures on an accused to plead guilty are consid-
ered illegal inducements; for example, threatening harsher penalties, including in-
dictment as a habitual offender, are legitimate negotiating tactics).
20 See Bontkowski v. United States, 850 F.2d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that threats to prosecute a defendant's pregnant wife were not sufficient to render his
plea involuntary); United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 1000 n.6 (1st Cir. 1988)
(stating that a family member threatened with indictment is not sufficient to render a
plea involuntary).
21 See Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454-55 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the defendant's guilty plea was not involuntary given that the alleged unlawful
promises were made by non-governmental agents).
22 Brady, 397 U.S. at 750; see also Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942)
(noting that a guilty plea that is the product of coercive law enforcement conduct is
inconsistent with due process); United States v. Casallas, 59 F.3d 1173, 1176-78 (11th
Cir. 1995) (holding that guilty plea was coerced due to court's participation in plea
negotiations).
23 See Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).
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Though it would be preferable if the court were required to ensure
that a defendant fully comprehended every element of a subject of-
fense, 24 the Constitution does not require such rigidity.25 Instead, as
enunciated in Henderson v. Morgan,26 a demonstrable understanding
of only those elements deemed "critical" to a particular offense is
essential. 27
Henderson involved the murder of a woman by a nineteen year-old
defendant with "substantially below average intelligence." 28 Though
indicted for murder in the first-degree, the defendant ultimately pled
guilty to second-degree murder.29 In a subsequently filed habeas peti-
tion, Morgan challenged the voluntariness of his plea, arguing, inter
alia, that he was not advised that "intent to cause death was an ele-
ment of the offense."30 The Supreme Court agreed, finding that the
trial court's failure to inform Morgan of the "critical" element of in-
tent rendered his plea involuntary. 31 To that end, the Court made the
following observations:
There is nothing in this record that can serve as a substitute for
either a finding after trial, or a voluntary admission, that respon-
dent had the requisite intent. Defense counsel did not purport to
stipulate to that fact; they did not explain to him that his plea would
be an admission of that fact; and he made no factual statement or
admission necessarily implying that he had such intent. In these
24 If a defendant is said to possess a true understanding (as opposed to a mere
general comprehension) of the nature of the offense, it seems logical that a defen-
dant, when entering a guilty plea, should be aware of all the elements required by law
to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession
which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing re-
mains but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 242 (1968).
25 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, at 996-98 (describing generally the nature of
the charge requirement).
26 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
27 Id. at 647 n.18.
28 Id. at 642. It was noted that the defendant's "functioning I.Q." was "between
68 and 72." Id. at 642 n.9.
29 • See id. at 642.
30 Id. at 639.
31 Id. at 647. The Court stated:
There is no need in this case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or
substance, of a charge always requires a description of every element of the
offense; we assume it does not. Nevertheless, intent is such a critical element
of the offense of second-degree murder that notice of that element is
required.
Id. at 647 n.18.
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circumstances it is impossible to conclude that his plea to the unex-
plained of second-degree murder was voluntary.
Normally the record contains either an explanation of the charge
by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel
that the nature of the offense has been explained to the accused.
Moreover, even without such an express representation, it may be
appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely
explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the ac-
cused notice of what he is being asked to admit. This case is unique
because the trial judge found as a fact that the element of intent was
not explained to respondent. Moreover, respondent's unusually
low mental capacity provides a reasonable explanation for counsel's
oversight; it also forecloses the conclusion that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, for it lends at least a modicum of
credibility to defense counsel's appraisal of the homicide as a man-
slaughter rather than a murder.3 2
Two notable aspects from Henderson thus emerge. First, as noted,
a defendant is entitled to notice of only those elements considered
"critical" to a particular charge. Second, the Court cited a rather
scopic basis upon which this minimal standard might be satisfied. In
addition to a defendant's in-court admission, a court may rely upon a
host of other circumstantial indicia from which to infer such knowl-
edge. These bases, none of which seemingly require independent de-
fendant affirmation, include defense counsel stipulation to the
element, defense counsel representation that the charges had been
explained, trial court explication, or, on occasion, mere presumption
of defense counsel explanation.
In addition, a defendant must comprehend certain penal conse-
quences associated with a guilty plea. Though a guilty plea invariably
produces a myriad of penal consequences, a defendant need only be
cognizant of those consequences "directly" associated with the plea.3 3
Defined by some courts as an "immediate, and automatic conse-
quence [ I] of the guilty plea, '3 4 the concept of a "direct" consequence
is, at least in an interpretive sense, imprecise. However, it is fair to say
that, at a minimum, a defendant must be informed of the maximum
possible penalty as well as the existence of any mandatory mini-
32 Id. at 646-47.
33 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 756-57 (1970).
34 Warren v. Richland County Circuit Court, 223 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 2000).
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mums. 35 Nevertheless, a court's failure to advise a defendant of a "di-
rect" consequence does not necessarily render a guilty plea infirm.3
6
Given this limitation, a defendant need not understand those pe-
nal consequences considered to be merely "collateral" to the plea.
For instance, it has been held that a defendant need not be informed
of the possibility of probation revocation, 37 ajudge's discretionary au-
thority to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence, 38 the effect of
a guilty plea on good time credits, 3 9 the loss of civil service employ-
ment,40 the right to vote and unencumbered foreign travel, 4 1 the pos-
35 This requirement has been adopted in the federal system as well as in many
states. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(c). For additional discussion of the requirements
under federal law, see infra notes 55-82 and accompanying text; see also United States
v. Watch, 7 F.3d 422, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the district court violated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 by failing to advise defendant of mini-
mum mandatory sentence); State v. Coban, 520 So. 2d 40, 42 (Fla. 1988) (finding that
the trial court erred, under Florida law, by failing to advise defendant of minimum
mandatory penalty); People v. West, 317 N.W.2d 261; 262 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (ob-
serving that under Michigan law, a trial court must advise a defendant of the maxi-
mum sentence and any mandatory minimum); State v. Hendrick, 543 N.W.2d 217,
221 (N.D. 1996) (noting that under North Dakota law, prior to acceptance of a guilty
plea, a defendant must be advised of the mandatory minimum penalty, if applicable,
and the maximum possible sentence); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, at 998-99 (pro-
viding general discussion of "direct" and "collateral" plea consequences).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-85 (1979) (holding that
the court's failure to inform the respondent of the mandatory special parole term
before accepting the guilty plea was merely a formal violation of Rule 11, insufficient
to require vacating respondent's sentence). For additional discussion of judicial
omissions with respect to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 requirements,
see infra notes 79-82, 179-217 and accompanying text.
37 See Warren, 223 F.3d at 457 (holding that trial court was not required to inform
defendant of probation revocation possibility).
38 See United States v. Wills, 881 F.2d 823, 827 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that trial
court's discretion to impose either a consecutive or concurrent sentence was not a
"direct" consequence of defendant's plea).
39 SeeJohnson v. Puckett, 930 F.2d 445, 448 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that plea
was entered knowingly and voluntarily despite court's failure to inform defendant of
the consequences of his plea on his good time credits).
40 See United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying motion to withdraw guilty plea
based upon claim that defendant did not foresee, as a consequence of his guilty plea,
the loss of his job as a fireman).
41 See Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1964) (finding that
defendant was not entitled to notice of collateral consequences of his plea, such as
the loss of civil rights).
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sible appearance before a psychiatric panel prior to release on
parole,42 and the possibility of deportation. 43
Moreover, before a guilty plea can be accepted, the court must be
satisfied that the defendant understands the nature of the constitu-
tional rights that he is necessarily waiving.44 The Supreme Court, in
Boykin v. Alabama, considered the validity of a guilty plea entered in
an Alabama state court, where "[s]o far as the record show[ed], the
judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning his plea, and peti-
tioner did not address the court. '45 In finding that the petitioner's
due process rights were violated, the Court reasoned:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that
takes place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial.
First, is the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaran-
teed by the Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by reason
of the Fourteenth. Second, is the right to trial byjury. Third, is the
right to confront one's accusers. We cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal rights from a silent record.46
In response to Boykin, numerous states47 and the federal govern-
ment,48 revised their plea procedures by, inter alia, requiring that
courts affirmatively forewarn defendants with respect to such constitu-
tional waivers prior to accepting a guilty plea.49
42 See Bargas v. Bums, 179 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that there is
no process violation where the court failed to inform a defendant of collateral conse-
quences of his plea, such as submission to review before a state psychiatric review
board to determine parole eligibility).
43 See United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that
lower court was not required to advise alien defendants of potential deportation).
44 See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1968).
45 Id. at 239. The defendant, who was a twenty-seven-year-old African-American,
entered guilty pleas to five counts of robbery. Id.
46 Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
47 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-1-2 (West 1976); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 556.1 (West Supp. 2001); MAss. R. CaUm. P. 12(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1022
(1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 135.385 (1999); see also LAFAvE ET AL., supra note 15, at 1000
(noting changes in states' laws).
48 See FED. R. Cum. P. 11(c).
49 Finally, in a limited circumstance, courts are constitutionally required to deter-
mine that a factual basis underlies a plea of guilty. In North Carolina v. Alford, the
Supreme Court held that a trial judge, "[i]n view of the strong factual basis for the
plea demonstrated by the State," did not commit constitutional error when it ac-
cepted a guilty plea despite the defendant's protestation of his innocence. 400 U.S.
25, 38 (1970).
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II. RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Originally enacted in 1944, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure was rudimentary in context, limited in breadth, and
provided little procedural guidance to federal courts with respect to
the taking of pleas. It simply provided:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to
accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear,
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.50
In 1966, there were a couple of notable, albeit substantively un-
remarkable, amendments to Rule 11. Presumably implemented with
an underlying concern for "fairness" and "equal justice," the contex-
tual vagueness of the addendums arguably undercut its laudable pur-
pose.51 For example, appended to the rule was a fourth sentence
requiring the finding of a factual basis for the plea.52 Despite the ad-
ded obligation, however, the courts retained substantial discretion
with respect to implementation. The Advisory Committee's notes ex-
plain that the court was by no means bound by a defendant's repre-
sentations as to his criminal conduct:
The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the
attorney for the government, or by examining the presentence report, or other-
wise, that the conduct which the defendant admits constitutes the
offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense in-
cluded therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty. Such
inquiry should, e.g. protect a defendant who is in the position of
pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the
50 FED. R. CRM. P. 11 (1944), reprinted in BENDER'S FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL 539
(Raymond Cannon & Russell E. Newkirk eds., 1948).
51 See the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 Advisory Committee's
notes (1975 amendments), which provide, in pertinent part:
The great majority of all defendants against whom indictments or informa-
tions are filed in the federal courts plead guilty. Only a comparatively small
number go to trial. The fairness and adequacy of the procedures on accept-
ance of pleas of guilty are of vital importance in according equal justice to all
in the federal courts.
FED R. CRiM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1975 amendments) (citation omitted).
52 Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure for the U.S. District Courts, 383
U.S. 1095, 1097 (1966 amendments) (providing, in pertinent part, that a "court shall
not enter ajudgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea").
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charge but without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall
within the charge.53
Thus, a court could find the existence of a factual basis absent
any inquiry whatsoever of the defendant with respect to his criminal
conduct. In additfon, the second sentence of Rule 11 was modified so
as to require courts to address defendants personally during the plea
colloquy and to ensure the comprehension of a plea's
consequences.5 4
The federal response to Boykin came in 1975 and "drastically" al-
tered the existing rule.5 5 In contrast to the rather general verbiage
that characterized the pre-1975 rule, the new version delineated a lit-
any of affirmative judicial obligations designed, primarily, to better en-
sure the entry of knowing and voluntarily guilty pleas.56 Now
composed of several sections and subsections, perhaps the most nota-
ble amendments appeared in subsection (c), which delineated the
items and rights that a courf was mandated to inform a defendant and
to ensure their understanding. It provided:
(c) ADVICE TO DEFENDANT. Before accepting a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant person-
ally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he
understands, the following:
the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the
mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the
maximum possible penalty provided by law; and
53 FED. R. GMR. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1966 amendments) (emphasis
added).
54 The revised sentence now provided:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with under-
standing of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.
Amendments to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 383 U.S. at 1097.
55 See 1A CHARLEs ALAN WRiGT-rr & ARTHUit R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 171 (3d ed. 1999). For an excellent in-depth discussion of Rule 11, its
history, and related issues, see id. at §§ 171-178.
56 The Advisory Committee's notes identify two underlyinj objectives to the
modifications:
(1) Subdivision (c) prescribes the advice which the court must give to
insure that the defendant who pleads guilty has made an informed plea.
(2) Subdivision (e) provides a plea agreement procedure designed to
give recognition to the propriety of plea discussions; to bring the existence
of a plea agreement out into the open in court; and to provide methods for
court acceptance or rejections of a plea agreement.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1974 amendments).
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if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has
the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the
proceeding against him and, if necessary, one will be appointed
to represent him; and
that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea
if it has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried
by ajury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of coun-
sel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against
him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself;
and
that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a
further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo con-
tendere he waives the right to a trial; and
that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask
him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and
if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in
the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against
him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement.57
The heightened specificity contained in the new rule was seem-
ingly designed to remedy the perceived deficiencies associated with
the shortened version.5 8 Yet, within the new structure, the courts re-
tained substantial discretion with respect to its implementation. For
instance, the Advisory Committee's notes provide that regarding a de-
fendant's comprehension of the nature of the crime:
The method by which the defendant's understanding of the nature
of the charge is determined may vary from case to case, depending
on the complexity of the circumstances and the particular defen-
dant. In some cases, ajudge may do this by reading the indictment
and by explaining the elements of the offense to the defendants. 9
Like the old rule, the 1975 version retained the requirements of
personal address by the judiciary and that a plea be deemed voluntary
57 Act ofJuly 31, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89 Stat.,370. The amendments added:
Subdivision (c) prescribes the advice which the court must give to the defen-
dant as a prerequisite to the acceptance of a plea of guilty. The former rule
required that the court determine that the plea was made with "understand-
ing of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea." The
amendment identifies more specifically what must be explained to the de-
fendant and also codifies, in the rule, the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama,
which held that a defendant must be apprised of the fact that he relin-
quishes certain constitutional rights by pleading guilty.
FED. R. CRim. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1974 amendments) (citation
omitted).
58 See id.
59 Id.
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prior to acceptance. 60 The new rule also required that a court be sat-
isfied that the plea was the product of neither force nor threats, and
determine whether prior discussions between the government and the
defendant and/or his counsel influenced the plea decision.61
Subsection (e) was also added, detailing procedures "designed to
prevent abuse of plea discussions and agreements by providing appro-
priate and adequate safeguards." 62 Unlike subsection (c), the "safe-
guards" referenced in subsection (e) were not confined to plea
hearing activity, but encompassed pre-plea prosecutorial and judicial
conduct. The new subsection, inter alia, recognizes the propriety of
plea bargaining63 and the various plea disposition alternatives (dismis-
sal of charges; non-binding government recommendation for the im-
position of a particular sentence; non-binding government agreement
not to oppose a defendant's request for a particular sentence; and a
binding recommendation that a specific sentence is appropriate);64
prohibits judicial participation in the negotiation process;65 requires
disclosure by the court, on the record, of the plea agreement in either
open court or in camera;66 authorizes judicial acceptance or rejection
of a proffered plea arrangement;67 and requires a court, if it decides
60 See id. Subsection (d) currently provides:
Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant person-
ally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result
of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court
shall- also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or
nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the attorney for the
government and the defendant or the defendant's attorney.
FED. R. CrM. P. 11(d).
61 See id.
62 FED. R. CRM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1974 amendments).
63 See FED. R. Cram. P. 11(e)(1).
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id. 11 (e) (2).
67 See id.; see also id. 11(e)(3)-(4). Subsection (e)(2) further authorized the
court to "accept or reject the agreement, or... defer its decision as to the acceptance
or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report."
Id. 11 (e) (2). This aspect of the rule was amended in 1979 and clarified the court's
options with respect to acceptance of the various plea types specified in subsection
(e) (1), as well as a defendant's right to withdraw his plea under subsection (e) (1) (B).
The amended version provided, in pertinent part:
If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision (e) (1) (A) or (C), the
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the
acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the
presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in subsection
(e) (1) (B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does not
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to reject a proffered plea agreement, to notify the defendant in open
court or in camera, provide the defendant an opportunity to withdraw
his plea, "and advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea
or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case may be less
favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement. ''68
The requirement that the trial court satisfy itself that a factual
basis exists-for the plea was retained under the new version. 69 Like
the earlier rule, the court retained the discretion to find a factual basis
from a defendant's statements, from those of his attorney or the gov-
ernment attorney, from the presentence report, "or by whatever
means is appropriate in a specific case. '70
Rule 11 underwent additional modification in the 1980s.
Though comparatively modest, and sometimes purely technical,71
there were, nevertheless, some notable reforms. Subsection (c) (1)
was altered in 198272 by appending "the effect of any special parole
term" to the litany of items requiring judicial explication prior to the
acceptance of a guilty plea. 73 The phrase "or supervised release" was
accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no
right to withdraw his plea.
Id.
68 Id. 11(e) (4).
69 See id. 11 (f). Subsection (f) provides: "Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwith-
standing the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment
upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual
basis for the plea." Id.
70 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1974 amendments).
71 See id. (1987 amendments) ("The amendments are purely technical. No sub-
stantive change is intended.").
72 There were also changes to subsection (c) (4) and (c) (5). The subsections
were amended to read:
(4) that if a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted by the court
there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo
contendere the defendant waives the right to a trial; and
(5) if the court intends to question the defendant under oath, on the
record, and in the presence of counsel about the offense to which the defen-
dant has pleaded, that the defendant's answers may later be used against the
defendant in a prosecution for perjury or false statement ....
FED. R. CiM. P. 11(c)(4)-(5).
73 Id. 11(c) (1). The Advisory Committee's notes to the amendments explain the
purpose underlying the enactment:
The purpose of the amendment is to draw more specific attention to the fact
that advice concerning special parole terms is a necessary part of Rule 11
procedure. As noted in Moore v. United States:
Special parole is a significant penalty.... Unlike ordinary parole, which
does not involve supervision beyond the original prison term set by the
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also added to this list in 198974 in response to the promulgation in
1987 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines as part of the 1984
Sentencing Reform Act.75
Since a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere necessa-
rily waives his appellate fights with respect to alleged pre-plea constitu-
tional breaches, 76 conditional pleas were added to the list of plea
alternatives in subdivision (a) to obviate the necessity of going to trial
in order to preserve such appellate claims. 77 Now, a defendant desir-
ous of higher court review, may, under this new subdivision, enter a
guilty plea, yet seek appellate relief.78
Also in 1983, an entirely new subsection was added to Rule 11.
Enacted to address inadvertent judicial oversight with respect to Rule
court and the violation of which cannot lead to confinement beyond
that sentence, special parole increases the possible period of confine-
ment. It entails the possibility that a defendant may have to serve his
original sentence plus a substantial additional period, without credit for
time spent on parole. Explanation of special parole in open court is
therefore essential to comply with the Rule's mandate that the defen-
dant be informed of "the maximum possible penalty provided by law."
592 F.2d 753, 755 (4th Cir. 1979).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1982 amendments).
74 FED. R CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (1989 amendments).
75 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 211-239, 98 Stat.
1837, 1987-2040. The Advisory Committee's notes explain, in pertinent part:
The Committee believes that a technical change, adding the words "or su-
pervised release," is necessary to recognize that defendants sentenced under
the guideline approach will be concerned about supervised release rather
than special parole. The words "special parole" are left in the rule, since the
district courts continue to handle pre-guideline cases.
The amendment mandates that the district court inform a defendant that
the court is required to consider any applicable guidelines but may depart
from them under some circumstances.... By giving the advice, the court
places the defendant and defense counsel on notice of the importance that
guidelines may play in sentencing and of the possibility of a departure from
those guidelines.
FED. R. CrIM. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1989 amendments) (citation
omitted).
76 See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
77 See FED. R. CraM. P. 11(a) (2).
78 See id. Subsection (a) (2) provides:
Conditional Pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of the
government, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to re-
view of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.
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11 procedure, 79 subsection (h) allows for certain colloquial omissions
to be deemed harmless.80
Finally, in response to the "increasing practice of including provi-
sions in plea agreements which require the defendant to waive certain
appellate rights," 81 subsection (c) (6) was added in 1999 which re-
quires courts to inform a defendant of the "terms of any provision in a
plea agreement waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the
sentence."
82
III. THEODORE KACzYNsKI's PLEA COLLOQUY
As noted, it is beyond the scope of this Article to critique the
merits of the Kaczynski petition. However, an examination of the un-
derlying plea colloquy is highly instructive, for it is representative of
accepted Rule 11 practice and is, therefore, illustrative of the inade-
quacies of the current structure. Accordingly, referenced below are
selective excerpts.
COURT: I'm informed that you wish to change the plea you have
previously entered to a plea of guilty. Is that correct?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor.83
COURT: Your case in the United States District Court, District of
NewJersey, cannot be handled in this court unless you wish to plead
guilty or nolo contendere. Do you understand that if you allow that
case to be handled in this court, you are agreeing to plea [sic] guilty
or nolo contendere, waive proceedings in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey in which the crimes were alleg-
edly committed, and you're allowing those crimes to be proceeded
against you in this court? Do you understand that?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, sir. I understand that.84
79 See FED. R. CruM. P. 11(h) advisory committee's notes (1983 amendments)
("An inevitable consequence of the 1975 amendments was some increase in the risk
that a trial judge, in a particular case, might inadvertently deviate to some degree
from the procedure which a very literal reading of Rule 11 would appear to
require.").
80 The new rule provides:
(h) Harmless Error. Any variance from the procedures required by this rule
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
FED. R. GRIM. P. 11 (h).
81 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(6) advisory committee's notes (1999 amendments).
82 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(6).
83 Pretrial Transcript, United States v. Kaczynski, No. C-S-96-259GEB, 1998 WL
22017, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1998).
84 Id. at *16-*17.
[VOL- 77:2
FEDERAL GUILTY PLEAS UNDER RULE 1 1
COURT: Are you entering this plea of guilty voluntarily because it is
what you want to do?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: I'm now going to have the Government explain the terms
of your plea agreement with the Government.
LAPHAM [Government attorney] :° Your Honor, the terms of the
agreement are as follows: the defendant agrees to plead guilty to all
outstanding charges in Sacramento and in New Jersey. There will
be a total of 13 counts. In return for a plea of guilty-that is an
unconditional plea of guilty.
In return, the Government agrees to withdraw the notice of intent
to seek the death penalty. And the defendant understands that
under those circumstances, he would be sentenced to a mandatory
term of life imprisonment without possibility of release.
There are also other conditions regarding payment of restitution.
The defendant understands that restitution is required under the
relevant statutes, as well as agreements as to the disgorgement of
future earnings, if any, that are obtained by the defendant or on his
behalf as a result of any writings, interviews, 6r access to the defen-
dant in the future.
I think that states the essential terms of the plea agreement. 85
COURT: Are those the terms of your plea agreement with the Gov-
ernment as you understand them?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor.8 6
COURT: Has anyone attempted to any way to force or threaten you
to plead guilty in this case?
KACZYNSKI: No, Your Honor.87
COURT: If economic loss has been suffered by a victim as a result of
this criminal conduct, the Court, in accordance with the Sentencing
Reform Act, shall order you to make restitution unless the Court
finds that, under the statute, restitution is not appropriate in this
case.
You understand that is a consequence of your plea, sir?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I understand that.8 8
COURT: Do you understand that parole has been abolished and
that if you plead guilty, you will spend the rest of your life in prison
and you will never be released or paroled?
85 Id. at *19.
86 Id. at *19-'20.
87 Id. at *20.
88 Id. at *21.
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KACZYNSKI: I understand that, Your Honor.89
COURT: Do you understand that you have a right to plead not
guilty to any offense charged against you and to persist in that plea,
that you would then have the right to a trial by jury, during which
you would also have the right to the assistance of counsel for your
defense, the right to assist in the selection of that jury, the right to
see and hear all the witnesses and have them cross-examined in
your defense, the right on your own part to decline to testify unless
you voluntarily elected to do so in your own defense, and the right
to the issuance of subpoenas or compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses to testify in your defense, the right to re-
quire the Government to prove your guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to appeal this conviction and your sentence and
any rulings made by the district court? Do you understand you have
all those rights?
KACZYNSKI: I understand that, Your Honor.9 0
COURT: I'm now going to have the Government to state each of
the essential elements of the offenses in the indictment so that I can
be assured that the defendant understands the charges.
LAPHAM: Your Honor, there are three types of offenses in the two
indictments.
There are several counts of transportation of an explosive device
with intent to kill or injure. With respect to that charge, the Gov-
ernment would be required to prove, number one, that transporta-
tion in interstate commerce; two, of an explosive; three, with the
knowledge or intent that it would be used to kill, injure or intimi-
date any individual.
With respect to the crime of mailing explosive device with intent to
kill or injure, the Government would be required to prove, one,
that the defendant knowingly deposited for mailing or knowingly
caused to be delivered by mail a device or composition that could
ignite or explode; and, two, that the defendant acted with the intent
to kill or injure another.
And with respect to the third type of offense charged in the two
indictments, using a destructive device in relation to a crime of vio-
lence, the Government would be required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant used or carried a bomb and that
he did so during and in relation to a crime of violence, that crime of
violence being the use of that bomb.
COURT: Mr. Kaczynski, do you understand those charges?
89 Id. at *22.
90 Id.
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KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I understand them.
COURT: I'm now going to have the Government's attorney to make
a representation concerning the facts the Government would be
prepared to prove at trial. Again, Mr. Kaczynski, I want you to listen
to the factual representation made by the Government's attorney,
because after it's made, I will ask you the question, "Do you agree
with the factual representation just made by the Government's at-
torney?" And I want you to be in a position to respond to the
question.9 1
Thereafter, the government's attorney provided a detailed factual
basis that comprised several transcript pages. In response to periodic
inquiry by the court, Kaczynski responded that he agreed with the gov-
ernment's factual representations. 92
A. Leading Questions, Compound Questions, and the Rule 11 Process
Upon initial examination, it would appear that the Kaczynski
court fully complied with the requirements mandated by Rule 11. In-
deed, the court, inter alia, addressed Kaczynski personally in open
court, informed him of the nature of the charge, the possible penal-
ties, and the sentencing guideline features, as well as the forfeiture of
associated constitutional rights and appellate privileges.93 Moreover,
the court found that the plea was entered voluntarily, was not induced
by force or threats, and that there was a supporting factual basis.9 4
Yet, the Kaczynski plea colloquy typifies the inadequacies of the
Rule 11 statute. It epitomizes a process inundated with evidential and
procedural inconsistencies, with a design to enhance judicial economy
at the expense of individual due process. To see this, I begin with a
review of certain evidentiary principles.
Rule 611 (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of
a witness except as may be necessary to develop the witness' testi-
mony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on cross-
examination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be
by leading questions.9 5
91 Id. at *22-*23.
92 See id. at *23-*37.
93 For discussion of the court colloquy with respect to the waiver of appellate
privileges during the Kaczynski plea hearing, see infra notes 160-78 and accompany-
ing text.
94 Pretrial Transcript, Kaczynski, 1998 WL 22017, at *37.
95 FED. R. EvID. 611(c).
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In a sense, virtually all questions can be considered leading.
Questions such as, "What happened next?" or "Where did you go?," if
nothing else, lead the witness to the next aspect of the story they are
recounting. But only certain types of leading questions are prohibited
and only in selective contexts. It is commonly accepted that a ques-
tion is leading if "it so suggests to the witness the specific tenor of the
reply desired by counsel that such a reply is likely to be given irrespec-
tive of an actual memory. ' 96 Whether through improper phrasing, an
inflective tone, or proscribed nonverbal activity,9 7 a question can be
deemed leading, and potentially objectionable, if the witness "would
get the impression that the questioner desired one answer rather than
another."98
As noted earlier, whether leading questions are permitted or pro-
scribed is dependent upon context. Indeed, the restrictive and per-
missive distinctions identified in Rule 61199 are not the byproduct of
arbitrarg classifications, but stem from sound rationales. With respect
to direct examination, concerns about witness susceptibility underlie
the general prohibition. The empathy typically existent between the
direct examiner and witness necessarily subjects the witness to the
leads of the examiner.100 Their shared litigative interests heighten
the risk that a witness, rather than testify of his own accord, will simply
defer to the leading or suggestive questions posed by the examiner.101
As noted by Professor Michael H. Graham:
Leading questions are considered harmful for three reasons:
First, they may invoke in the witness a "false memory" of events,
to the end that his testimony will not reflect what he actually
saw or remembers.
Second, they may induce the witness to lessen efforts to relate
what he actually remembers, in favor of acquiescence in the
examiner's suggested version of events. He might do so be-
cause he is ill at ease in the setting of the courtroom (which is
to him at once unfamiliar, formal, public, and intimidating),
because he is more accustomed to the conventions of polite
conversation where imprecision is often inconsequential and
96 United States v. Durham, 319 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1963).
97 See 1 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611.8, at 827-28
(4th ed. 1996); 3JACKB. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE1 6111[05], at 611-77
to -78; see also Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that
restrictions are "designed to guard against the risk of improper suggestion inherent in
examining friendly witnesses through the use of leading questions").
98 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 6 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999).
99 FED. R. EVID. 611 (c) advisory committee's notes.
100 See id.
101 See id.
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not the occasion for correction or dispute, because he does not
understand the issues at stake in the suit, or perhaps because
he hopes to speed the process along.
Third, they may distract the witness from important detail by
directing his attention only to aspects of his story which the
questioner considers favorable.
10 2
In contrast, the concerns that underlie Rule 611's delimiting lan-
guage are generally inapplicable to cross-examination. 10 3 The litiga-
tive discord that characterizes most cross-examining relationships
renders it unlikely that a witness will be susceptible to the leads of the
examiner. Unlike direct examination, the witness during cross-exami-
nation regards the examiner as an adversary-as an individual who
seeks to impede his litigative interests.
10 4
These rules, however, are not inflexibly applied, but are subject
to exceptions. According to the Advisory Committee's notes for Rule
611,105 on direct examination, it is permissible to pose leading ques-
tions with respect to uncontested preliminary matters, 10 6 to either a
minor'0 7 or adult witness "with communication problems,"' 08 to "hos-
tile, unwilling, or biased" witnesses,' 0 9 and to witnesses with failed
memories." 0 Similarly, if a witness on cross-examination is deemed
102 1 GRAHAi, supra note 97, § 611.8, at 827 n.4 (quoting G. Stephen Denroche,
Leading Questions, 6 Crm. L.Q. 21, 22 (1963-1964)).
103 See David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.G. L. REv.
1155, 1183 (1992) (stating that concerns of witness bias in favor of the examiner,
witness manipulation by the examiner, and witness assent to the examiner's questions
are typically not present during cross examination).
104 See 81 Am. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 853 (1992) ("On the one hand, it has been
pointed out that the reason for the rule permitting leading questions to an adverse
witness on cross-examination is the assumed hostility of such witness to the cross-
examiner's cause.").
105 FED. R. EVID. 611(c) advisory committee's notes (1972 proposed rules).
106 See United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1363 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that
the district court properly permitted the government to ask witness leading questions
since many of the questions concerned preliminary matters).
107 See United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
leading questions asked of child witness who was having difficulty testifying in sexual
abuse case was proper).
108 United States v. Stelivan, 125 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that dis-
trict court properly allowed government to ask leading questions of adult witness who
was "inarticulate and evasive").
109 United States v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1065 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that dis-
trict court did not err by allowing government attorney to ask leading questions of its
primary witness who the court deemed to be "hostile").
110 See United States v. Bodey, 547 F.2d 1383, 1385-87 (9th Cir. 1977) (permitting
defense counsel to ask leading questions of witness with alleged memory difficulties).
2002]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
friendly, then leading questions may, in the court's discretion, be
disallowed.111
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 611 (a), a court is empowered to "ex-
ercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation
and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth [and]
(2) avoid needless consumption of time .. .. "112 Thus, it is within a
court's discretion to prohibit modes of examination it deems unac-
ceptable. 113 "Compound questions" are such an example. Defined as
a query that poses two or more questions,114 this mode of interroga-
tion is objectionable on direct and cross-examination given its inher-
ent ambiguity. For example, questions that ask, "Did the defendant
approach your teller station and did you get a good look at him?," or
"Did the defendant confess and did he do so at the police station?,"
are compound because they ask more than one question. 115 Moreo-
ver, a "yes" or "no" response to such a question is confusing since it
will be unclear as to what aspect of the question the answer
pertained.116
United States v. Watson 1 7 is illustrative of the problems associated
with compound questioning. Talib Watson was convicted in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia of an array of
narcotic related offenses arising out of events that occurred on Sep-
tember 27, 1995 in the northeastern quadrant of Washington, D.C. 1 8
At trial, it was critical for the prosecution to establish a connection
between Watson and a large quantity of cocaine base and heroin that
111 See Alpha Display Paging v. Motorola Commun. & Elecs., Inc., 867 F.2d 1168,
1171 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in al-
lowing Motorola to ask leading questions during its cross-examination of another Mo-
torola employee who had been called to testify by Alpha).
112 FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
113 See ROBERT E. JONES ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACrICE GUIDE: FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS
& EVIDENCE 9:45 (1999) (citing the following as objectionable question types, "in-
cluding questions that: are leading and suggestive ...; call for inadmissible opinions
or conclusions...; are compound...; call for cumulative testimony...; [and] call for
narrative answers. .. ").
114 See 1 GRAHAM, supra note 97, § 611.16.
115 See id.
116 See id.; see also Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 623-24 (7th
Cir. 2000) (stating that a compound question can make a simple "yes" or "no" answer
ambiguous because it remains unclear which statement or statements were answered).
117 171 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1999). For a case comment on Watson, see generally
Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Unusual Harm from a Compound Question, 14 CRIM. JusT. 40
(1999).
118 Watson, 171 F.3d at 697.
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was found in a Subaru automobile." 9 Given that he neither owned
the vehicle nor was observed therein, the prosecution proffered an
inferential connection. °2 0 According to the prosecution, a search sub-
sequent to Watson's arrest uncovered a key to the Subaru, which they
asserted was registered to TyraJackson, Watson's alleged girlfriend.1 2 '
In an effort to establish their relationship, the following colloquy oc-
curred during cross-examination between the prosecutor and Ray-
mond Thomas, a defense witness:
Prosecutor: Mr. Thomas, you believe that you know Watson's girl-
friend, Tyra Jackson, right
Thomas: I never testified that I knew her or not.
Prosecutor: You believe that you may have met her once or tvice,
right?
Thomas: Maybe. 122
Over defense objection, the government was permitted to argue
during summation that the evidence established that TyraJackson was
Watson's girlfriend. 123 During closing, the prosecutor stated:
We have the registration to the car, the Subaru. I[t] is in the name
of TyraJackson.... The only evidence we have about TyraJackson
is Thomas's answer, one of the defense witnesses, "Do you think you
met TyraJackson?" "Well, I think I met her once or twice. I think
I've met Watson's girlfriend, TyraJackson once or twice." TyraJack-
son's car, the registration to the Subaru.12 4
On appeal, Watson sought a new trial arguing, inter alia, that "the
prosecutor's subsequent misstatement of the evidence during closing
argument substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial."125 The D,C.
Circuit agreed, finding that the government's use of a compound
question, coupled with the prosecutor's subsequent misstatements
during summation, required reversal. 126 The court noted:
Moreover, the prosecutor's question reflects his understanding that
connecting Watson to the drugs in the Subaru was critical to the
government's distribution case. Yet at the time he cross-examined
Raymond Thomas, the prosecutor had yet to establish that the
owner of the Subaru was Watson's girlfriend. The lack of clarity in
Raymond Thomas's testimony stemmed directly from the prosecu-
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id. at 697-99.
122 Id. at 699.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 699.
125 Id. at 698.
126 Id. at 699-702.
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tor's use of a compound question and his assumption of a key fact
not in evidence. 12 7
As referenced above, the Kaczynski court often utilized leading
and/or compound questioning during its plea colloquy and based its
finding that the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily on a series
of mechanical and sometimes monosyllabic responses. Though the
Federal Rules of Evidence are seemingly inapplicable to federal plea
hearings,1 28 the dangers associated with such questioning modes in
this context are just as real. To see this, it is important to recall the
rationales underlying the rules.
When a defendant decides to enter into a plea agreement, the
defendant has presumably determined that it is in his optimum inter-
est to accept the proffered plea arrangement. In other words, he has
reasoned that acceptance of the plea agreement, as he understands it,
is preferable to an alternative form of resolution (e.g., seeking dismis-
sal of the case, an alternative plea arrangement, or going to trial).
Given that most plea agreements are non-binding, 29 and it is within a
court's discretion whether to accept the proffered arrangement, 30
the defendant has every incentive to curry favor with the court. On
the one hand, he seeks the court's acceptance of the agreement and
the imposition of the negotiated sentencing recommendation. Yet,
his position is precarious, subject to an array of external factors (e.g.,
judicial mood, temperament, and prejudices, legal and factual find-
127 Id. at 701.
128 Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(b) provides that its provisions are applicable to,
inter alia, "criminal cases and proceedings." FED. R. EvID. 1101 (b). However, Federal
Rule of Evidence 1101(d) further lists those instances where the rules are
inapplicable:
(1) Preliminary questions of fact-The determination of questions of fact
preliminary to admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be deter-
mined by the court under rule 104.
(2) Grand jury-Proceedings before grand juries.
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings-Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
preliminary examinations in criminal cases; sentencing, or granting or
revoking probation; issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal sum-
monses, and search warrants; and proceedings with respect to release on
bail or otherwise.
Id. 1101(d).
129 See Olivia W. Karlin & Carlton F. Gunn, A Response to the Reno Bluesheet: Prosecu-
tors Should Bargain About Guideline Factors and Use Binding Pleas, 6 FED. SENTENCING REP.
315, 316 (1994) (observing the infrequent employment of binding Rule 11 (e)(1)(C)
plea agreements in their jurisdiction and advocating greater employment of such
agreements).
130 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(3)-(4); see also supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
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ings, judicial sentencing philosophy, etc.). Indeed, this vulnerability
to judicial influence is reflected in the Advisory Committee's notes to
Rule 11(e) (discussing judicial involvement in plea negotiations):
The unequal positions of the judge and the accused, one with the power
to commit to prison and the other deeply concerned to avoid prison, [at]
once raise a question of fundamental fairness. When a judge be-
comes a participant in plea bargaining he brings to bear the full
force and majesty of his office. His awesome power to impose a substan-
tially longer or even maximum sentence in excess of that proposed [in the
proposed plea agreement] is present whether referred to or not.131
Given this susceptibility, a defendant when pleading will display a
deferential demeanor. He will seek to placate judicial concerns with
respect to his conduct; his overall deportment will be respectful. He
will exhibit remorse (whether real or feigned), as well as his positive
personal traits (e.g., he has a family, is working, etc.), and his deco-
rum will be polite and courteous. In short, he will seek to positively
impress the court in order to attain the hoped-for bargain.
Indeed, the judge-defendant relationship within this context is
akin to the direct examiner-witness relationship. Both associations are
characterized by "witnesses"' 32 who are prone to the leads of their ex-
aminers. Neither is motivated to challenge the mode or direction of
the question. Nor is there any incentive to contest an examiner's con-
tentions. Instead, the "witnesses" in both instances are deferential to
their examiners. Each "witness" positively considers their examiner as
a conduit to achieving their litigative objective. As with the direct ex-
amination witness, the defendant, rather than viewing the examiner-
judge as hostile to his interests, seeks to curry his favor. Such incen-
tive renders him susceptible to the court's leads, without similar impe-
tus to challenge improperly phrased questions.
This runs counter to the impetus of the witness on cross-examina-
tion, who is generally disinclined to readily accept his examiner's as-
sertions. The competing interests that characterize most cross-
examining relationships are simply not' present in the plea hearing
scenario. The defendant, seeking the benefit of the proffered bar-
gain, is dependent upon the court for its achievement. Accordingly,
unlike the cross-examination witness whose interests are furthered
131 See FED. R. CraM. P. II (e) advisory committee's notes (1974 amendments) (em-
phasis added).
132 The term "witnesses" in this context is intended to encompass both the defen-
dant in the guilty plea hearing and a witness during direct examination at trial.
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through confrontation, the defendant's litigative interests are fur-
thered through judicial appeasement. 133
Illustrative is Godinez v. Moran.'34 At issue was whether the com-
petency standard applicable for standing trial was the same for plead-
ing guilty and waiving one's right to counsel. 135 Having been charged
with three counts of capital murder, defendant Richard Moran ini-
tially entered a plea of not guilty.13 6 Thereafter, Moran was evaluated
by psychiatrists who found him competent to stand trial. 137 After the
State of Nevada announced its intention to seek a death sentence, and
after the passage of approximately two and a half months since the
psychiatric evaluations, Moran moved the court to discharge his coun-
sel and to enter a guilty plea.'38 Relying heavily upon prepared psy-
chiatric reports, and after some additional questioning, the trial court
deemed Moran competent to waive his counsel right and to enter a
plea of guilty.' 3 9 Moran's guilty plea was then accepted, and he was
later sentenced to death. 140
After a subsequently submitted habeas petition (challenging his
competence to have waived counsel and enter a guilty plea) was de-
nied in federal district court, the Ninth Circuit reversed,' 4 ' finding
that the lower court had applied an incorrect standard in determining
133 Moreover, with respect to compound questioning, there is no reason to pre-
sume that such questioning during a plea colloquy are any less confusing or would
render any more intelligible responses than in a trial setting. The inherent ambiguity
attendant to such queries and their accompanying responses render such questions
equally objectionable in this context.
134 509 U.S. 389 (1993).
135 See id. at 391. The Court stated that there is no reason for the competency
standard for pleading guilty or waiving the right to counsel to be higher than that for
standing trial since the decision to plead guilty, though profound, is no more compli-
cated than the sum total of decisions that a defendant may have to make during the
course of a trial, such as whether to testify, whether to waive ajury trial, and whether
to cross examine witnesses for the prosecution. See id. at 398-99.
136 Id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 391-92.
139 See id. at 392.
140 Id. at 392-93. The Nevada Supreme Court later affirmed the convictions for
two of.the murders, but reversed his death sentence for the third murder (his ex-wife)
and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See id. at 393.
141 Id. In his petition before the Ninth Circuit, Moran argued that he was "not
legally competent to make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of constitu-
tional rights at the time he discharged his counsel and changed his pleas to guilty."
Moran v. Godinez, 972 F.2d 263, 264 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Moran's competency. 42 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit made the
following pertinent observations:
On the day that Richard Moran discharged his counsel and
changed his pleas, he was taking four different kinds of drugs.
When the state judge asked Moran if he was taking drugs, he re-
plied that he was on medication. The state judge inquired no fur-
ther on this issue. The court accepted Moran's waiver of counsel and
pleas of guilty, which Moran communicated in a series of monosyllabic re-
sponses to leading questions from the court about his legal rights and the
charged offenses. 14 3
In Moran's case, there was substantial evidence available at the time
he pled guilty to trigger a good faith doubt about his competency to
waive constitutional rights. Moran had attempted suicide only a few
months before his plea hearing. In addition, Moran stated at the
plea hearing that he wanted to fire his attorney to ensure that no
mitigating evidence would be presented on his behalf at sentencing.
The transcript of the plea hearing shows that virtually all of Moran's re-
sponses to the. court's questions were monosyllabic. 4
Though the United States Supreme Court later reversed the
Ninth Circuit with respect to the competency standard,145 Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, in their dissent, eloquently, and in considera-
ble depth, expressed the concerns shared by the Ninth Circuit regard-
ing the mechanical nature of Moran's plea colloquy.' 46 The
dissenters were skeptical that the mode of questioning-which in-
cluded both leading and compound queries-was truly probative of
142 See Moran, 972 F.2d at 266-67. Regarding the applicable standard of compe-
tency, the Ninth Circuit held:
The legal standard used to determine a defendant's competency to stand
trial is different from the standard used to determine competency to waive
constitutional rights. A defendant is competent to waive counsel or plead
guilty only if he has the capacity for "reasoned choice" among the alterna-
tives available to him. By contrast, a defendant is competent to stand trial if
he merely has a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and is
capable of assisting his counsel. Competency to waive constitutional rights
requires a higher level of mental functioning than that required to stand
trial.
Id. at 266 (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
144 Id. at 265 (emphasis added) (footnote and citation omitted).
145 See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397-99 (finding that the competency standard for waiv-
ing counsel and pleading guilty was identical to the standard for standing trial).
146 See id. at 409-17.
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Moran's competence to stand trial, waive his right to counsel, and
enter a guilty plea.1 4
7
Disregarding the mounting evidence of Moran's disturbed mental
state, the trial judge accepted Moran's waiver of counsel and guilty
pleas after posing a series of routine questions regarding his understanding
of his legal rights and the offenses, to which Moran gave largely monosyllabic
answers. In a string of affirmative responses, Moran purported to acknowl-
edge that he knew the import of waiving his constitutional rights, that he
understood the charges against him, and that he was, in fact, guilty of those
charges. One part of this exchange, however, highlights the mechan-
ical character of Moran's answers to the questions. When the trial
judge asked him whether he killed his ex-wife "deliberately, with
premeditation and malice aforethought," Moran unexpectedly re-
sponded: "No. I didn't do it-I mean, I wasn't looking to kill her,
but she ended up dead." Instead of probing further, the trial judge
simply repeated the questions, inquiring again whether Moran had
acted deliberately. Once again, Moran replied: "I don't know. I
mean, I don't know what you mean by deliberately. I mean, I pulled
the trigger on purp6se, but I didn't plan on doing it; you know what
I mean?" Ignoring the ambiguity of Moran's responses, the trial
judge refrained the question to elicit an affirmative answer, stating:
"Well, I've previously explained to you what is meant by deliberation
and premeditation. Deliberate means that you arrived at or deter-
mined as a result of careful thought and weighing the consideration
for and against the proposed action. Did you do that?" This time,
Moran responded: 'Yes."
It was only after prodding Moran through the plea colloquy in this manner
that the trial judge concluded that he was competent to stand trial and that
he voluntarily and intelligently had waived his right to counsel. Accord-
ingly, Moran was allowed to plead guilty. ... 148
IV. RACIAL/ETHNIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The perilousness of the Rule 11 process is even more conspicu-
ous when viewed in light of the racial, ethnic, and educational back-
grounds of the offender populace, the frequency that the plea
mechanism is invoked, as well as the financial and professional disin-
centives associated with indigent representation. According to United
States Department of Justice statistics, among the federally convicted
in 1998, the vast majority of defendants (93%) disposed of their cases
147 See id. at 409-12.
148 Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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by pleading guilty.149 In addition, more than half of the defendants
that pled guilty in 1991 had appointed counsel, 150 a disproportionate
percentage were either African American or Hispanic, and over two-
thirds had no more than a high school education. 5 1 These figures
depict more than merely a federal criminal system heavily dependent
upon a facile plea structure. It portrays a plea process that com-
promises individual due process often at the expense of the nation's
least fortunate.
Nor are the inadequacies associated with the Rule 11 process ap-
preciably mitigated by the presence of appointed counsel during plea
negotiations. 15 2 Consider the following. An attorney appointed to re-
present an indigent defendant in the federal system is authorized to
receive up to $75 per hour for time spent on a case, subject to a maxi-
mum allowance.15 3 This fee arrangement, however, is not only inade-
149 Compendium of Federal justice Statistics, 1998, in U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JusTIcE STATISTICS 51, 54 (2000) (observing that of the 60,598 defendants that were
convicted during 1998, 56,896 pled guilty) [hereinafter Compendium of Federal Justice
Statistics, 1998].
150 Steven K. Smith & CarolJ. DeFrances, Indigent Defense, in U.S. DEP'T OFJusTiCE,
BUREAU oFJuslcE STATISTICS 3 (1996) (observing that in 1991 76% of defendants in
state court had appointed counsel, and 54% had appointed counsel in the federal
system). Moreover, among African-American federal inmates, in 1991 33% had re-
tained counsel, while 64% had counsel appointed by the court. See id. Compara-
tively, 49% of white federal defendants retained counsel, while 48% had counsel
appointed. See id.
151 In 1998, among cases concluded by United States Attorneys, 67% of all con-
victed defendants were white, 27.7% were black, and 5.3% had their race classified as
'other." See Compendium of FederalJustice Statistics, 1998, supra note 149, at 57. With
respect to ethnicity, 36.9% of convicted defendants were Hispanic and 63.1% were
non-Hispanic. See id. Finally, regarding education, 43.3% of convicted offenders had
not graduated from high school, 30.7% were high school graduates, 18.7% had some
college, and only 7.3% were college graduates. See id.
152 See Smith & DeFrances, supra note 150 and accompanying text (noting the
majority of federal convicts, especially African-American defendants, have appointed
counsel).
153 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(d) (1994). Subsection (d) (2) provides, in pertinent part:
For representation of a defendant before the United States magistrate or the
district court, or both, the compensation to be paid to an attorney or to a
bar association or legal aid agency or community defender organization
shall not exceed $3,500 for each attorney in a case in which one or more
felonies are charged, and $1,000 for each attorney in a case in which only
misdemeanors are charged. For representation of a defendant in an appel-
late court, the compensation to be paid to an attorney.., shall not exceed
$2,500 for each attorney in each court.
Id. § 3006A(d) (2).
It shiuld be noted that pursuant to subsection (d) (3), these maximum figures
may, in the court's discretion, be waived in certain instances. See id. § 3006A(d) (3).
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quate to cover basic expenses generally associated with a given case,154
but it pales when compared to the financial return typically incurred
with retained clients who are tendering a much higher fee. Thus, irre-
spective of the litigative merits of a particular matter, the full litigation
of indigent cases is plainly discouraged by the federal fee structure.
Instead, economic considerations encourage the quick settlement of
indigent cases in order to expend greater energy upon those cases
that yield a greater economic return.155
Moreover, reputation incentives do not offset these economic in-
fluences. To the extent that premature and/or ill-advised plea deci-
sions adversely impact an attorney's professional reputation, such
costs, to the extent they can be measured, are minimal, especially in
light of the economic interest conflicts discussed above. As stated by
Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer in the context of plea negotiation:
In the market for appointed counsel, there is essentially no search-
ing and thus little to be gained by a reputation for effective plea
negotiation. To make matters worse, fees are usually uniform for all
attorneys appointed in a given court. Not only does an impressive
reputation for tough bargaining fail to promise more appointments,
but the appointed attorney's hourly rate is independent of reputa-
tion. Indeed, because the fee schedule is uniform, economic theory
predicts that the more favorable an attorney's reputation (and
hence the higher his free-market earning power), the ess likely he is
to accept court appointments. To the extent that reputations for
effective bargaining can be developed and communicated to pro-
spective clients, the effective bargainers will tend to be under-
represented in the pool of attorneys who provide indigent criminal
defense.
Positive reputation incentives are never wholly absent, in plea bar-
gaining any more than elsewhere in life. But overall those incen-
tives are much too diluted to offset the immediate financial
considerations that create an acute divergence of interest between
attorney and client. Reputation incentives are thus bound to oper-
ate much less effectively at the margin in plea bargaining that they
do at trial, where effort and skill are openly on display and where
154 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 55-56 (1988) (stating that the inadequate compensation for court-
appointed attorneys in the federal system creates dangerous incentives for the lawyer
to settle the case).
155 See id. Schulhofer adds that "It]he economic theory of agency costs provides
powerful reasons for predicting that settlements will occur in cases that a reasonably
well-counseled defendant would prefer to see tried." Id. at 56.
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favorable impressions are crucial to any of the career opportunities
that an attorney may aspire to pursue.
156
While such financial disincentives exist with respect to privately-
appointed counsel, these economic influences obviously do not iden-
tically impact the federally-employed public defender. 5 7 Neverthe-
less, like private sector counsel, public defenders are similarly
subjected to conflicting interests that necessarily compromise indigent
representation. Case load concerns-:-attributable, in part, to limited
office resources, coupled with individual retentive, promotional, and
salary considerations-will often conflict with the litigative interests of
the clients they represent. Accordingly, plea deals will often be pur-
sued in order to promote these organizational and/or individual
objectives.' 5 8
When considering this data and the above-described incentives, it
'is critical to bear certain things in mind. The plea hearing is the prin-
cipal oversight mechanism by which to assess an individual's kn6wl-
edge and voluntariness with respect to a proffered plea arrangement.
When the terms and litigative consequences of a proposed plea ar-
rangement are disclssed with the client, neither the judge, nor the
prosecutor, nor any independent arbiter are present. No other party
can, therefore, attest to counsel's proper explication of the agree-
ment's terms, its penal and litigativ e consequences, or the defendant's
comprehension or voluntariness. Instead, reliance is placed almost
entirely upon the plea hearing to make these assessments. However,
with a plea structure ripe with methodological inconsistencies, and,
the various financial and professional disincentives attendant to indi-
gent representation, it is improper to merely assume, without more,
that either process adequately protects individual due process. The
representative disincentives not only encourage premature case reso-
156 Id. at 60.
157 See Smith & DeFrances, supra note 150, at 2 ("The Federal justice system pro-
vides indigent defense to eligible defendants through the Federal Defender Services,
community defender organizations, and private attorneys as established by the Crimi-
nal Justice Act of 1964, as amended.").
158 Professor Stephen J. Schulhofer observes:
Within his office, defenders interested in peer approval, promotion, salary
increases, or simply job retention will need to respect the priority on rapid
case disposition by obtaining plea agreements whenever possible. Given lim-
ited resources, such attorneys might make rational opportunity cost calcula-
tions. Monitoring problems aside, they presumably will direct their effort to
cases in which it will do the most good. But even under these assumptions,
the guilty plea recommendation they make in a particular case is not neces-
sarily in the individual interest of that client
See Schulhofer, supra note 154, at 54.
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lutions, but also discourage the full explication of the litany of items
and consequences delineated in Rule 11. Simply put, "time is
money. ' 159 The disincentives associated with indigent representation
compromise both the full and fair pursuit of just litigative conse-
quences, as well as the time expended explaining the terms and con-
sequences of a proffered plea arrangement. And the Rule 11
mandates serve as an inadequate check upon this explicative process.
V. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. The Waiver of Appellate Rights
The prevalence of appellate waiver provisions in federal plea
agreements1 60 severely, and unjustly, restricts a defendant's ability to
contest plea and/or sentencing determinations. 161 A mere perfunc-
tory oral recitation of this waiver consequence is all that is required by
Rule 11.162 Thus, it is tenable to surmise that most defendants sum-
marily waive their appellate rights' 63 with respect to plea and/or sen-
tencing matters without an adequate comprehension of the impact of
the waiver. Not atypical is the appellate waiver provision in the Ka-
czynski plea agreement, which rather summarily provided:
Waiver of Appeal Rights: The defendant agrees to waive all rights to
appeal this plea and sentence including any legal rulings made by
the district court.164
Moreover, during the plea hearing, there was only a cursory dia-
logue regarding the aforementioned waiver provision:
COURT: Do you understand that by entering into the plea agree-
ment you have entered with the Government, you will have waived
159 Benjamin Franklin, Advice to a Young Tradesman (1748), reprinted in THE OX-
FORD DICrIONARY OF QUOTATIONs 218 (3d ed. 1979).
160 SeeJohn L. Keeney, Justice Department Memo: Use of Sentencing Appeal Waivers to
Reduce the Number of Sentencing Appeals, 10 FED. SENTENCING REP. 209, 209 (1998) (re-
producing memorandum, dated October 4, 1995 from Assistant Attorney General
John C. Keeney encouraging United States Attorneys to employ appellate waiver lan-
guage in their plea agreements).
161 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (h) ("Any variance from the procedures required by this
rule which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded."); see also supra
notes 81-82 and accompanying text (observing that due to the prevalence of such
provisions in federal plea agreements, subsection (c) (6) was appended to Rule 11,
which requires courts to inform defendants of such waiver clauses).
162 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(h).
163 SeeJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (affirming that the right to appeal
is not constitutionally mandated).
164 Memorandum of Plea Agreement, United States v. Kaczynski, No. CR-S-96-
259GEB, 1998 WL 27872, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1998).
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or given up your right to appeal all or any part of your plea of guilty
and anything else that occurs during this conviction hearing and
anything that occurs during your sentencing hearing?
KACZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor. 165
COURT: Do you further understand that if you plead guilty, you will
waive right to appeal any legal rulings made by the district court?
KACZYNSKI: I understand that, Your Honor.16
6
Such provisions, however, have been upheld by every circuit that
has considered their validity. 167 Though the issue remains unresolved
within the District of Columbia Circuit, two District of Columbia dis-
trict court cases have refused to enforce plea agreements containing
appellate waiver provisions. 168 In United States v. Raynor, the following
waiver provision was at issue:
Your client understands and acknowiledges that Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal
the sentence imposed after a plea of guilty or trial. After consulta-
tion with counsel, and in exchange for the concessions made by this
Office in this plea agreement, your client voluntarily and knowingly
waives the right to appeal any sentence within the maximum pro-
vided in the statute(s) of conviction, or the manner in which that
sentence was determined, on the grounds set forth in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742 or on any ground whgLtever. Your
client also voluntarily and knowingly waives your client's right to
challenge the sentence or the manner in which it was determined in
any collateral attack, including but not limited to a motion brought
under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255. Your client fur-
ther acknowledges and agrees that this agreement does not limit
the Government's right to appeal a sentence, as set forth in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3742(b). 169
In refusing to accept the provision, the court reasoned that a de-
fendant cannot knowingly and intelligently waive his "right to appeal a
sentence that has yet to be imposed-a sentence that may ultimately
165 Id. at "21-*22.
166 Id. at *22.
167 See Michael O'Shaughnessy, Abstract, Appellate Review of Sentences, 88 GEO. L.J.
1637, 1637-38 & n.2497 (2000) (observing that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have upheld such provisions).
168 See United States v. Raynor, 989 F. Supp. 43, 49 (D.D.C. 1997); United States v.
Johnson, 992 F. Supp. 437,438-39 (D.D.C. 1997). In both cases, the court refused to
enforce plea agreements containing appellate waiver provisions requiring defendants
to forego challenges to a sentence yet to be imposed.
169 Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 43.
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be illegal, unconstitutional or otherwise improper, ' 170 that the De-
partment of Justice was attempting to unfairly manipulate the appel-
late review of district court sentencing decisions,171 and, most notably,
that the waiver language was an inaccurate description of the law.172 This
fact, as the Raynor court observes, has not only been acknowledged by
the Department ofJustice, but also by circuit courts which have previously
ratified such provisions:173
Despite the unforgiving language of the waiver provision, the gov-
ernment acknowledges that such provisions do not in fact waive all
rights to appeal. It does not concede, however, that this fact should
be spelled out in the agreement or explained to defendants. As the
[former Assistant Attorney General John C.] Keeney memorandum
states:
A sentencing appeal waiver provision does not waive all claims
on appeal. The courts of appeals have held certain constitu-
tional and statutory claims survive a sentencing appeal waiver in
a plea agreement. For example, a defendant's claim that he
170 Id. The court added:
Such a waiver is by definition uninformed and unintelligent and cannot be
voluntary and knowing. Until the sentence is imposed, the defendant can-
not possibly know what it is he or she is waiving. A plea that requires such a
waiver of unknown rights cannot comport with Rule 11 or the Constitution.
Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
171 See id. at 45. The court noted that the waiver provision precluded defendant
initiated review of sentencing decisions, yet granted the United States "an unob-
structed path to the courts of appeals." Id. The court continued:
Now much of the sentencing judgment and policy is within the discretion of
the Sentencing Commission. And because of the prosecutor's traditional
charging discretion and added leverage in sentence bargaining and charge
bargaining in the post-Guidelines world, the discretion to cabin the parame-
ters of the sentence is very much in the control of the prosecutor rather than
the court.
... To the extent that the government seeks methods and means of avoiding
appellate review of; the exercise of prosecutorial power in the sentencing
context, effectively circumventing what Congress intended, however, it is
plainly the responsibility of the judiciary to uphold and protect the criminal
justice process from such manipulation.
... For the future, this would mean that every Sentencing Guideline case
considered by the court of appeals would be a case brought by the govern-
ment to correct errors that favor defendants. The appellate courts would
never again decide a sentencing case brought by a defendant. Not only is
that inherently unfair, but it also eliminates the symmetry Congress in-
tended by Section 3742.
Id. at 45-46.
172 Id. at 46.
173 Id. at 46-47.
[VOL. 77:2
FEDERAL GUILTY PLEAS UNDER RULE 1 1
was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
United States v. Attar [38 F.3d 727 (4th Cir. 1994)]; that he was
sentenced on the basis of his race, United States v. Jacobson, 15
F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 1994); or that his sentence exceeded the statu-
tory maximum, United States v. Main, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th
Cir. 1992), will be reviewed on the merits by a court of appeals
despite the existence of a sentencing appeal waiver in a plea
agreement. 174
Thus, the government asks the Court to assume that a defendant
who, by the government's own admission, is misinformed about his
or her rights and the extent of the waiver in a plea letter and at a
plea proceeding nevertheless understands those rights and can
knowingly and intelligently waive them by virtue of the language of
the proposed paragraph in the plea agreements.... [N] either the
plea agreement nor the Rule 11 colloquy can assure that a defen-
dant knows what his or her rights are and what is purportedly being
waived. 175
To suggest that Rule 11 adequately ensures that a defendant
knowingly and voluntarily waives his appellate rights is simply disin-
genuous. Not only is the waiver of appeal verbiage in most, if not all,
federal plea agreements substantively inaccurate, but the brusqueness
encouraged by Rule 11 often results in a forfeiture of appellate rights
via a single leading and/or compound question. 176 Absent an oral
174 Though only the Second and Fourth Circuits are acknowledged in Raynor,
other circuits have recognized that certain appellate claims survive a contractual
waiver. See, e.g., DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding
that ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly raised despite plea agreement
waiver of right to seek § 2255 post-conviction relief); United States v. Williams, 184
F.3d 666, 668-69 (7th Cir. 1999) (observing that a waiver of appeal provision does not
preclude an appeal of a sentence based upon an impermissible factor, such as race, or
a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum); United States v. Henderson, 72 F.3d
463, 465 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claim survives
an appellate waiver).
175 Raynor, 989 F. Supp. at 46-47 (quoting United States Department of Justice
Memorandum from John C. Keeney, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to all United
States Attorneys 2 (Oct. 4, 1995)).
176 See, e.g., Williams, 184 F.3d at 668-69 (7th Cir. 1999) (relying upon an appel-
late waiver provision, the Seventh Circuit dismissed a defendant's appeal challenging
his sentence). The case is notable, however, for the apparent confusion on the part
of the district court about the scope of appellate rights being forfeited. During the
plea colloquy, the following discourse occurred:
THE COURT: Now I know that in your presentence-or, your plea agree-
ment you've waived your right to appeal, but, I want you to understand that
under certain circumstances you might nevertheless be able to appeal and
there are certain rights that you may have left. I don't know. I want you to
know that there is at least the potential there. Do you understand that?
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explication of what was understood, or, at a minimum, judicial imple-
mentation of an alternative method of discerning defendant compre-
hension and intent, it is simply fallacious to suppose that current Rule
11 mandates protect individual due process with respect to appellate
waivers.1 77 Without more, a meaningful discernment of such waiver
provisions, 'and, thus, a knowing and voluntary relinquishment of ap-
pellate privileges, cannot be blithely presumed. 178
MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, your honor.
Id. at 669. Though the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, finding that the district
court was "technically accurate" and that Williams knowingly and voluntarily relin-
quished his appellate rights, the court acknowledged "that the district court's oral
comments regarding the possibility for appeal could have been clearer" and that "the
district court's colloquy regarding waiver was not without some minor ambiguity." Id.
at 669. It is certainly tenable to surmise, however, that the court's lack of clarity ("I
don't know," etc.) was attributable to the agreement's inaccurate statement of the law,
as well as the court's unawareness about the scope of rights being forfeited.
177 An additional aggravating factor was noted in United States v. Johnson, 992 F.
Supp. 437 (D.D.C. 1997). In refusing to accept an appellate waiver provision, the
court observed that a significant bargaining power differential existed between the
United States and the defendant.
Finally, the Court is unwilling to accept the specific waiver of appeal rights
provision offered to the defendant because the same plea agreement does
not limit the government's right to appeal a sentence. This glaring inequal-
ity strengthens the conclusion that this kind of plea agreement is a contract
of adhesion. As a practical matter, the government has bargaining power utterly
superior to that of the average defendant if only because the precise charge or
charges to be brought-and thus the ultimate sentence to be imposed under
the guidelines scheme-is up to the prosecution. To vest in the prosecutor the
power to require the waiver of appeal rights is to add that much more unconstitu-
tional weight to the prosecutor's side of the balance.
Id. at 439-40 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The government's superior bargaining advantage, and their arguable ability to
impose undesirable plea conditions, has been discussed in academic literature as well.
See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2071-72 (2000) ("Some legal
scholars have suggested that the overall imbalance in the relative bargaining strengths
of the defendant and the government in the plea bargaining process presents 'strik-
ing similarities to a contract made under duress.'"); Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1918 (1992) ("A decade ago...
Albert Alschuler argued that [plea bargaining] is contractually deficient in a host of
,ways: many of the bargains are unconscionable; defendants accept prosecutors' offers
under duress; the poor and ignorant suffer disproportionately; the bargains are the
product of irrationality and mistake.").
178 In addition to the appellate rights waiver, some United States Attorney's Of-
fices also include plea provisions requiring the forfeiture of a defendant's right to
challenge the withholding by the prosecution of so-called Brady information (mate-
rial evidence that is favorable to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88
(1963)); see also David E. Rovella, Federal Plea Bargains Draw Fire; "Brady Waivers"Aim
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B. The Harmless Error Doctrine
The harmless error doctrine, appended to Rule 11 in 1983,179 has
served to further aggravate the defendant's precarious plea posture.
To appreciate this fully, however, a brief historical review of events
leading up to the amendment is necessary. In 1969, the United States
Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States considered a defendant's
direct appeal challenging the validity of his guilty plea to a single
count of attempted tax evasion. 180 Specifically, the petitioner argued
that the trial court erred in accepting his plea "without first address-
ing [him] personally and determining that the plea [was] made volun-
tarily with understanding of the nature of the charge," and by failing
to determine if there was a factual basis. 18' Finding that Rule 11 had
been violated, and that the defendant was entitled to plead anew, the
Court reasoned:
[P] rejudice inheres in a failure to comply with Rule 11, for noncom-
pliance deprives the defendant of the Rule's procedural safeguards
that are designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the
To Make Deals Stick, but Defense Lauyers Balk, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 17, 2000, at Al (noting
that while the inclusion of Brady waiver provisions "has slowly been working its way
across the country," such clauses are standard in San Francisco, San Diego, and New
York, and has been used sporadically in Florida). Describing the ensuing battle be-
nween federal prosecutors and federal public defenders upon the reintroduction of
such clauses in the Northern District of California, defense attorneys Larry Kupers
and John T. Philipsborn write:
This standoff resulted in ancillary battle nothing short of the surreal. Assist-
ants in the Federal Defender's Office in San Francisco refused to sign the
"Defense Counsel Affirmation" attached to the standard plea agreement be-
cause with their signatures they "consented" to the defendant's entry into
the plea agreement. Given their belief that the Brady waiver wvas not only
adhesive and unconscionable but also unconstitutional and unethical, the
defenders could not consent to their clients' deals. The U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice then began to withdraw their plea offers, announcing that their offers
were contingent upon not only the defendants' agreement but also the de-
fense counsel's consent to the agreement. For three weeks no guilty pleas
pursuant to the plea agreements were consummated in the Northern Dis-
trict of California. Finally, prosecutors removed the "consent" language and
guilty pleas were once again heard throughout the kingdom.
Larry Kupers &John T. Philipsborn, Mephistophelian Deals: The Newest in Standard Plea
Agreements, THE CHAMn'ION, Aug. 1999, at 18, 70 n.22. Research has failed to uncover
any cases that have addressed the validity of such waiver provisions.
179 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(h) advisory committee's notes (1983 amendments); see
also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of the
harmless error provision to Rule 11).
180 394 U.S. 459, 460 (1969) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11).
181 Id. at 463.
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voluntariness of his plea.... It is, therefore, not too much to re-
quire that, before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment,
district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform them of
their rights and to determine whether they understand the action
they are taking.1
8 2
Though McCarthy construed judicial compliance with the pre-
1975 version of Rule 1 1,183 and found that reversal was mandated irre-
spective of any demonstrated prejudice,1 8 4 there was a divide among
the circuits regarding whether this automatic reversal position applied
to violations of the 1975 version of Rule 11. While some circuit courts
employed a harmless error approach when reviewing direct appeals1 8 5
alleging Rule 11 omissions,18 6 others mandated strict adherence to
the detailed requirements of the new rule.1 8 7 As noted by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Journet, employment of a harmless error stan-
dard not only frustrates congressional intent underlying Rule 11, but
also the import of the guilty plea process:188
182 Id. at 471-72.
183 See id. at 463.
184 See id. at 463-64.
185 There was a similar split with respect to habeas challenges alleging Rule 11
errors, with some courts employing a harmless error approach. See, e.g., Keel v.
United States, 585 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that district court's denial
of habeas petition was proper; trial court's failure to comply with literal terms of Rule
11 was harmless given the absence of any demonstrated prejudice). Others adhere to
a strict McCarthy interpretation. See, e.g., Yothers v. United States, 572 F.2d 1326, 1328
(9th Cir. 1978) (vacating district court denial of habeas petition, finding that district
court erred, irrespective of any demonstrated prejudice, by failing to advise defendant
of certain penal consequences).
186 See, e.g., United States v. Hamilton, 568 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that Rule 11 was not violated when prosecutor, not the court, informed defendant
of possible penalties); United States v. Coronado, 554 F.2d 166, 172-75 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that lower court complied with Rule 11, despite trial court's failure to
explain the meaning of "conspiracy," when record indicated that defendant under-
stood the term). See generally 1A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 55, § 178 (discussing
many of the cases cited in footnotes 185-87 and providing a thorough discussion of
harmless error in the context of Rule 11).
187 See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 566 F.2d 962, 966-67 (5th Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing, inter alia, that a trial court's failure to personally inform the defendant of certain
constitutional rights and the nature of the charge violated Rule 11); United States v.
Journet, 544 F.2d 633, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that Rule 11 violated by trial
court's failure to inform defendant of possible life-time parole and of certain constitu-
tional rights forfeited by virtue of his guilty plea); United States v. Boone, 543 F.2d
1090, 1092 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that defendant entitled to plead anew given trial
court's failure to adhere to Rule 1 's requirement that a defendant be informed of,
inter alia, possible perjury prosecution).
188 Journet, 544 F.2d at 636.
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Since a guilty plea amounts to a conviction which may have most
serious consequences for the accused in this case ... the acceptance
of the plea cannot be dealt with in a hasty or cavalier fashion. Fun-
damental constitutional rights are at stake, the loss of which could
hardly be classified as insubstantial or harmless. What is required is
"the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequence," Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. To permit Rule 52(a) to be
used as a means of by-passing the specific and detailed procedure
prescribed by Rule 11 would be to frustrate and defeat Congress'
expressed intention. Although the present appellant may have
been more disenchanted by the heavy sentence imposed on him
rather than by the court's failure to adhere to Rule 11, Congress'
purpose of insuring compliance with Boykin provides the governing
principle.18 9
This divide was settled, to some extent, in 1979 by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Timmrec. 19 ° There, the Court
considered a habeas petition that sought to vacate a sentence based
upon a district court's failure to inform the defendant of a mandatory
special parole term of at least three years.19 1 Noting the defendant's
failure to aver that he was either unaware of the penal provision or,
had such judicial instruction been rendered, that he would have
changed his plea decision, the Court held that a mere "technical viola-
tion" of Rule 11, without more, would not warrant collateral relief.19 2
Stressing the importance of "finality," especially in the context of
habeas challenges to the Rule 11 process, 19 3 the Court held that such
petitions would be granted only if the omission "resulted in a 'com-
plete miscarriage of justice' or in a proceeding 'inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of fair procedure."1 9 4
Notably, the Court hinted that a contrary result might have been
reached had the petitioner raised his contention on direct appeal. 19 5
189 Id. at 636.
190 441 U.S. 780 (1979).
191 Id. at 782. The defendant had entered a guilty plea to a narcotic conspiracy
offense. Id. at 781.
192 See id. at 784. The Court imposed a sentence of ten years imprisonment, a
special parole term of 5 years, and a fine. Id. at 782.
193 See id. at 784.
194 Id. (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).
195 The Court stated that "[h]is only claim is of a technical violation of the Rule.
That claim could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not. And there is no
basis for allowing collateral attack 'to do service for an appeal.'" Id. at 784 (citations
omitted).
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This ostensible distinction between direct and collateral challenges
left some circuits, in the wake of Timmreck, uncertain as to the breadth
of its application. 196 However, any lingering uncertainty dissipated
with the 1983 appendage of the harmless error provision to Rule
11.197 Now all circuits employ a harmless standard when assessing al-
leged Rule 11 violations.198
Thus, beginning with the 1975 revision of Rule 11, and its judicial
progeny, there has been a continual erosion of due process protec-
tions under the rule. Whereas judicial omissions were once consid-
ered inherently prejudicial, irrespective of any demonstrated harm,
today some circuits place the burden upon the defendant to demon-
strate prejudice with respect to judicial noncompliance with Rule
11.199 This burden shift is not only in conflict with the principles
enunciated in Boykin and McCarthy and the Advisory Committee's
notes to Rule 11 (h),200 but also with the standards employed by other
circuits that properly place the burden of demonstrating harmless er-
196 See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 619 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 1980) ("As an initial
matter, we note that the question of whether a harmless error standard is applicable
in direct appeals such as this has not yet been settled in this circuit."). The court
acknowledged, however, that, pursuant to Timmreck, harmless error applies to collat-
eral attacks. Id.
197 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the amendment of
the harmless error provision to Rule 11).
198 See Brent E. Newton, Disarray Among the Federal Circuits: Harmless Error Review of
Rule 11 Violations, 2J. App. PRAc. & PRocEss 143, 150 (2000).
199 See, e.g., United States v. Thibodeaux, 811 F.2d 847, 848 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. de le Puente, 755 F.2d 313, 315 (3d Cir. 1985).
200 The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 11(h), provide, in pertinent part:
[S]ubdivision (h) should not be read as supporting extreme or speculative
harmless error claims or as, in effect, nullifying important Rule 11 safe-
guards. There would not be harmless error.., where, for example, as in
McCarthy, there had been absolutely no inquiry by the judge into defen-
dant's understanding of the nature of the charge and the harmless error
claim of the government rests upon nothing more than the assertion that it
may be "assumed" defendant possessed such understanding merely because
he expressed a desire to plead guilty....
Indeed, it is fair to say that the kinds of Rule 11 violations which might be
found to constitute harmless error upon direct appeal are fairly limited ....
The second cautionary note is that subdivision (h) should not be read as an
invitation to trial judges to take a more casual approach to Rule 11 proceed-
ings. It is still true, as the Supreme Court pointed out in McCarthy, that
thoughtful and careful compliance with Rule 11 best serves the cause of fair
and efficient administration of criminal justice ....
FED. R. CuM. P. 11(h) advisory committee's notes (1983 amendment); see also
Newton, supra note 198, at 156 (urging the Supreme Court, "[i]n accord with the
Advisory Committee Notes and the Court's prior guilty plea jurisprudence . . . [to]
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ror upon the government.20 1 Predictably, individual due process has
suffered.
Illustrative is United States v. Cuevas-Andrade.202 The defendant,
Juan Cuevas-Andrade, had entered a guilty plea to illegally re-entering
the United States following deportation.20 3 On direct appeal, the de-
fendant sought opportunity to plead anew given the district court's
failure to inform him of, inter alia, the nature of the charge,20 4 the
maximum penalty,20 5 the effect of a supervised release term,20 6 the
application of the sentencing guidelines, the possibility of upward and
downward departures, 20 7 and the waiver of various constitutional
rights, "including his rights to plead not guilty, to be tried by ajury, to
confront witnesses at trial, to have assistance of counsel, and against
compelled self-incrimination." 208 Moreover, he cited the court's fail-
ure to advise him that he could be prosecuted for perjury or false
statement for false responses provided under oath at the plea hear-
ing209 and to determine that his plea was entered voluntarily.210
The Fifth Circuit, having placed the burden upon the defendant
to demonstrate prejudice, ultimately dismissed as harmless each of
cited omissions.21' The court largely, and often summarily, relied
upon the mere fact that the defendant had signed a plea agreement
that purportedly acknowledged his comprehension of these conse-
quences, as well as the defendant's failure to aver, or demonstrate,
actual prejudice from these omissions.212 The court's precipitous ac-
ceptance of such glaring and copious Rule 11 omissions, unfortu-
nately, typifies a disturbing trend. The protective ideals evinced by
the Supreme Court in McCarthy and Boykin, and the congressional in-
overrule the minority of circuits that place the burden on the defendant to show that,
but for the rule 11 error, he would not have pled guilty").
201 See, e.g., United States v. DeWalt, 92 F.3d 1209, 1213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
United States v. Graibe, 946 F.2d 1428, 1434-35 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Theron, 849 F.2d 477, 481 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Newton, supra note 198, at 152-56
(citing most of the cases in footnotes 199-201 and thoroughly discussing them within
the context of harmless error burdens).
202 232 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2000).
203 Id. at 442.
204 Id. at 444.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 445.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 446.
212 Id. at 444-46.
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tent underlying the 1975 revision of Rule 11, have been subjected to
an array of erosive appellate interpretations. As a result, in place is a
federal plea process that too often devalues individual due process in
favor of judicial economy.2 13
CONCLUSION
It bears re-emphasis that the problems associated with the cur-
rent plea structure primarily lie, not with United States district court
213 There are additional inauspicious post-plea consequences that further magnify
the harm of the Rule 11 process. A defendant who, for example, seeks to withdraw
his plea prior to sentencing may do so, but only upon presentment of a "fair and just"
reason. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e); see also United States v. Gaitan, 954 F.2d 1005, 1011
(5th Cir. 1992) (listing factors employed by the Fifth Circuit when deciding whether
withdrawal is appropriate; whether the government would be prejudiced; whether the
court would be substantially inconvenienced; whether the defendant delayed in filing
the motion; whether the original guilty plea was knowing and voluntary; whetherjudi-
cial resources would be wasted; whether the defendant has claimed innocence; and
whether adequate assistance of counsel was present) (citing United States v. Badger,
925 F.2d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1991)). In this vein, a "strong presumption" of truthful-
ness attaches to a defendant's statements made during the plea colloquy, see United
States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994), and a district court's refusal to
allow withdrawal will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Still, 102 F.3d 118, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1996), holding that there is no absolute right to
plea withdrawal and citing the following factors:
(1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether with-
drawal would prejudice the government; (3) whether the defendant delayed
in filing the motion, and, if so, the reason for the delay; (4) whether with-
drawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assis-
tance of counsel was available to the defendant; (6) whether the plea was
knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether withdrawal would waste judicial
resources.
Id.
Moreover, a court's factual findings, on either direct or collateral appeal, will be
reversed only upon a finding of clear error. For example, a defendant must demon-
strate clear error when asserting, inter alia, an insufficient factual basis, see United
States v. Hall, 110 F.3d 1155, 1157 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the clearly erroneous
standard applied when reviewing the district court's determination about whether
defendant used or carried a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime); improper
knowledge about sentencing consequences, see United States v. Milquette, 214 F.3d
859, 861-62 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that clearly erroneous standard applied when
reviewing the district court's determination about whether defendant understood his
sentence exposure pursuant to his plea arrangement); or improper awareness of the
nature of the charge, see United States v. DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 238 (11 th Cir. 1997)
(holding that the district court's determination that the appellants were properly ap-
prised of an aiding and abetting theory of liability was not clearly erroneous). Such
unreferenced and unspoken consequences leave the unwitting defendant in a litiga-
tive posture strewn with presumptive impediments that effectively hinder his pros-
pects for successful review.
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judges, but with Rule 11 and its appellate construction. Indeed, the
plain language of the rule imposes affirmative obligations upon dis-
trict courts that virtually mandate a methodological procession that
necessarily inhibits a true assessment of a defendant's knowledge and
a plea's voluntariness. For example, Rule 11(c) iequires a district
court to "inform the defendant of" the nature of the charge, an array
of associated penal consequences, and the forfeiture of several consti-
tutional and statutory rights, including, where applicable, the right to
appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.2 14 By virtue of this con-
striction, district courts understandably resort to leading and com-
pound questions to convey the required information.
The incantation of leading and compound questions and the ac-
companying monosyllabic responses have become an unfortunate sta-
ple of the Rule 11 process. For the circuit courts, these responses are
considered a reliable indicator of a plea's voluntariness and the level
of a defendant's knowledge. However, for reasons detailed previously,
a plea's voluntariness and a defendant's level of comprehension can-
not be adequately gleaned through such a process. Instead, a satisfac-
tory assessment can be had, most effectively, by requiring greater
defendant participation during the plea acceptance. By deleting the
"inform" requirement in Rule 11 (c), by prohibiting the use of leading
(subject to the delineated exceptions in Federal Rules of Evidence
611 (c)) and compound questions, and by requiring defendants to ex-
plain their understanding of the charge, plea terms, statutory and
constitutional rights, factual basis, and associated penal consequences,
a more efficient and equitable plea process can emerge. 215
Though, undoubtedly, this approach will substantially elongate
the plea in-take process, it will reduce considerably the number of
direct appeal and collateral challenges to guilty pleas. The greater
surety attendant to such a process will render it less likely that a defen-
dant will have a legitimate basis upon which to pursue a post-plea chal-
214 See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text.
215 SeeJohn L. Breeden, Jr. & Douglas M. Zayicek, Building a Better Guilty Plea, S.C.
L w., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 14, 19.
The judge may be able to improve the [guilty plea] process ... by allowing
the defendant to play a bigger role in the taking of a plea.
Specifically, the defendant could be asked to recite, in his or her own words,
the charges and the corresponding sentences that may be imposed, rather
than simply responding to a series of "yes" and "no" questions. A defendant
can also supply his or her own factual basis for the plea.
... Such an interaction on the record would give the PCR [post-conviction
relief] and appellate courts a better indication of the defendant's level of
understanding of the charges and possible sentences that may be imposed.
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lenge, and the resulting appellate efficiency, as well as the enhanced
fundamental fairness, will render a more sound guilty plea procedure.
Critics will, nevertheless, contend that the proposal is functionally im-
practical. Specifically, detractors will insist that the proposal inade-
quately accounts for the colloquial problems inevitably associated with
a defendant experiencing communicative or recollection difficulties.
This observation, however, overlooks an important aspect of the fed-
eral evidence rules. Under this proposal, the court, like the direct
examiner, retains the discretion to employ limited leading questions
in certain contexts. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c), the
general proscription against leading questions on direct is excepted
when confronted with a witness who has trouble communicating or
recalling information.216 Accordingly, this proposal permits a court to
employ limited leading questions-consistent with Rule 611(c)-
when, in its discretion, it is necessary to assist the defendant during
the plea colloquy.
Moreover, the harmless error provision should either be abol-
ished or, at a minimum, narrowly construed by the judiciary. As
noted, the courts-most notably after the 1975 revisions of Rule 11-
have retreated from the inherent prejudice posture adopted in the
years immediately following McCarthy.217 Underlying the inherent
prejudice standard was an understanding of the importance of each of
the items detailed in the rule, and a belief that a failure to fully adhere
to the strictures of the rule was necessarily harmful. Abolition or a
narrow construction of the provision would help restore the McCarthy
principles to the Rule 11 process. It would effectively mandate that
the courts, at a minimum, effectuate some colloquial discussion about
the listed items or risk reversal for noncompliance, and it would revive
the spirit of McCarthy to a rule that has lost much of its protective
gloss.
Indeed, the post-Boykin and McCarthy promise cannot be realized
absent meaningful reform of Rule 11. Strewn with an array of incon-
sistent applications, the plea ritual in the federal system, at its worst,
resembles little more than a facile procedure with a seeming design to
expedite criminal dispositions at the expense of individual due pro-
cess. The suggested reforms, however, will free the district courts of
the mechanistic ritual largely mandated by Rule 11 and, thus far, sanc-
tioned by the appellate circuits and supplant it with a process that will
ensure greater plea surety and restore the promise of the post-Boykin
and McCarthy era.
216 See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 179-212 and accompanying text.
